Do Populist Administrations Always Crash the Economy?
“Dollars, dollars.” Beneath the blazing sun, scores of money changers are offering US dollars on Florida Street, a bustling pedestrian strip in Buenos Aires. Known as arbolitos (“small trees”), their business is booming before the 26 October congressional elections in a country accustomed to holding the US dollar.
“The optimal moment for purchasing is now,” says one arbolito, refusing to provide her identity. “[The dollar] went down a little but it is a fake-out – it’ll rise again.”
Similar to her, economic experts from all backgrounds anticipate a devaluation of the Argentine peso after the voting concludes. The president has imposed a limit on the currency to tame triple-digit inflation and now it is overvalued and foreign reserves are exhausted, leaving Argentina’s economy stagnant as consumers turn to cheap imports.
Ideal Conditions
The nation represents a unique situation. The country has frequently been racked by sovereign defaults and financial turmoil and its voters have been receptive over the years to left-leaning populist movements, such as the influential Peronism, and currently Milei’s conservative populism.
The president epitomizes populist leadership: captivating, unconventional, vowing muscular measures to wrestle back control of economic management from the establishment for the benefit of the people.
These key characteristics are also seen in his political partner to the north, as well as the UK politician, who styles himself as a pint-swilling people’s champion even though he is a public school-educated former stockbroker.
Up until lately, Milei’s approach – involving widespread sell-offs and deep budget reductions – had won plaudits from the IMF for contributing to bring inflation in check. This plan shares similarities with the policies of Milei’s idol the former UK prime minister, who similarly viewed rising prices as a monster to be slain, regardless of the consequences.
However investors started to doubt in Milei’s radical project lately after a shaky result in local polls and multiple graft allegations. Solely massive financial intervention by the US has prevented what seemed destined to be a full-blown monetary collapse.
Contradictions
The vote for Brexit several years ago arguably had similar reasoning, and its figurehead, the former prime minister, dismissed doubts regarding fiscal impacts with confident resolve to enact public demand despite elite opposition.
The Reform leader has so far outlined limited plans in writing except for a call for large-scale removals, that he later seemed to adjust on the hoof. He wants to curb the central bank, perhaps even ditching its governor, Andrew Bailey, with distrust of a stodgy establishment being a key part of populist rhetoric.
His fiscal plans appear to be in flux: concerned about being accused of proposing reckless spending, he recently dropped a pledge to make significant tax cuts. His Reform party deputy, Richard Tice, stated they would concentrate instead on reductions in government expenditure.
The opposition aims this stance will allow it to portray Farage as planning to reintroduce austerity – an argument the chancellor has emphasized often, contrasting it with her strategy of boosting government spending.
An economics professor notes there are contradictions within the populist platform, such as it is. “The party is funded by very wealthy people calling for tax cuts and deregulation, but also emphasizing the grievances of ordinary workers and the loss of industrial jobs,” he explains. “There’s a tension here among wealthy supporters seeking radical free-market policies, and this narrative of bringing back British jobs and industrial revival.”
Holding on to Power
In truth, research indicates neither left nor right populists tend to fare well when confronting real-world challenges (though of course each charismatic individual promises something unique).
A recent paper from a leading journal analysed the performance of dozens of populist leaders, over more than a century. The study revealed that on average, after 15 years, GDP per capita is often 10% lower in nations governed by populist leaders compared to similar economies with more mainstream regimes.
“Economic disintegration, weakening economic fundamentals and the erosion of institutions typically go hand in hand with populist rule,” argue the paper’s authors.
Another intriguing finding from the study, however, is that despite their economic costs, populist figures tend to be good at retaining office, remaining in power for a considerable time, compared with shorter tenures for their more moderate equivalents.
In other words, it remains uncertain that even when their plans crash, such leaders face immediate consequences at the ballot box. Similar to pledges made to regain sovereignty, their attraction extends past everyday financial matters.
But returning to Buenos Aires, regardless of if Milei’s populist project fails or is kept on life support through foreign assistance, the Argentine people have already paid a heavy price.